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Abstract 
 The representation of violent extremist networks 
(VENs) and their behaviors within social simulations is 
required in order to leverage models and simulations for use 
in attack the network course of action analysis. VENs 
appear throughout the world in multiple forms with varying 
objectives and behaviors. They exist as a subset of society, 
nested within and leveraging the underlying social network 
of a culture to further their own ends. The interdiction of 
these networks to presents a challenging task for law 
enforcement and military organizations due to their ability 
to change and adapt to the situation at hand. The use of 
social simulation with VEN representations and designed 
simulation experiments can provide decision makers with 
insights into the potential impact of their actions to attack 
the threat network to include the likely manner in which the 
VEN might adapt to counter the attack. This paper discusses 
the requirements to represent VENs within simulations, 
provides an overview of the current VEN representation 
within the Cultural Geography model, and provides a case 
study analysis of the use of social simulations for the 




 Violent extremist networks are difficult to defeat 
because they are complex adaptive systems, which exhibit 
coherence under change and are able to anticipate and adapt 
without central direction [1-3]. One of the most critical 
factors in the success of countering violent extremist 
networks is an understanding of the civilian populace in the 
area of operations and the underlying factors that influence 
the population’s beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviors. 
Understanding how to achieve desired effects on the civilian 
populace in relation to their support of these violent 
extremist groups remains one of the most challenging areas 
for coalition forces, host nation forces, local police and 
governments. This problem is compounded by the inherent 
variance in human attitudes and behaviors, even within what 
one would consider a homogeneous population segment. 
Though a population might be homogenous in some 
dimensions, preferences can be heterogeneous [4]. Even 
within relatively small population areas, the number of 
unique population segments that a stabilizing force might 
have to interact with and understand grows at an alarming 
rate as does the complexity of the problem. The importance 
of gaining an understanding of the problem space and 
creating a transferable framework for modeling the beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions and behaviors of the civilian populace 
cannot be overstated. The ability to take a modeling 
framework, populate it with data from a given region, and 
gain insight into potential means to influence the populace 
in relation to these violent extremist networks (VEN) is of 
great importance. Social simulations present a mechanism to 
gain insight into this complex problem domain. Viewing 
violent extremist networks as subsets of the larger social 
network, moving among the social network structure like 
fish through the water [5]. The problem for stabilizing 
forces, whether police or military in nature, is one of 
identifying the fish within this conflict ecosystem [6]. The 
representation of violent extremist networks within social 
simulation requires a more detailed and sophisticated model 
of cognition than that required for the sea of society through 
which these sharks swim. 
 This paper will provide an overview of the 
requirements to represent violent extremist networks within 
social simulation, a brief overview of the Cultural 
Geography (CG) social simulation model, a detailed 
explanation of the current violent extremist network 
representation within this model, a case study analysis for 
attack the network course of action analysis using design of 
experiments in conjunction with social simulations, and a 
discussion of the path forward for more sophisticated 
models for violent extremist networks. 
 
2. VEN REPRESENTATION REQUIREMENTS  
 In order to represent VENs within social simulations a 
description of these networks and their behaviors is 
required. Examining the network and its functions, as they 
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impact society, is critical to any effort to represent these 
networks, their effects on an area or issue of interest and 
their behavior over time. In order to accomplish these tasks 
data describing VENs must be available or obtainable. In 
general terms then, the representation of VEN or any other 
actor requires knowledge of the actor and its behavior, 
algorithms that are acceptable for representing the 
phenomena of interest at the desired level of sophistication, 
and data, both quantitative and qualitative in nature. This 
section will discuss the ontological requirements for 
representing VENs, the minimum set of required behaviors, 
data requirements, and potential approaches for modeling 
cognition for application. 
 
2.1. VEN Ontology 
 The requirement to generate an ontology for the object 
to be represented corresponds to the knowledge 
development step in the general approach. The identification 
of this knowledge is required in any effort to gain an 
understanding about a problem. The development of 
simulation representations does not differ in this regard. 
Ontology provides a framework and key for reference 
reducing the bar to access for the knowledge for others and 
facilitating collaboration among multiple groups in seeking 
to expand the body of knowledge [7, 8].  
 In order to develop an ontology for a VEN we must 
provide an explicit description of the concepts or classes 
that make up a VEN, the attributes or roles of these 
concepts, and the restriction on these roles or constraints on 
these attributes. This general framework describing the 
components of the VEN combined with a specific set of 
instances of these concepts, attributes and restrictions taken 
together form a knowledge base [7, 8]. It is important to 
note that the development of ontology for any domain is an 
iterative process informed by subject matter experts in the 




Figure 1. Top level VEN representation for social simulation. 
2.1.1. VEN Behaviors 
 Behaviors are certainly a component of a complete 
ontology for a VEN, but bear further discussion because of 
their importance to the intended use of the VEN 
representation within social simulation for attack the 
network COA analysis. The intent of this section is to 
provide a description and justification for the minimum set 
of behaviors required to gain insight into means of attacking 
threat networks.  
 VEN behaviors are related to their objectives and 
motivation. The specific motivations for these behaviors 
varies by network type, but the general behavior choices 
available to these types of organizations seems consistent, 
whether the VEN is concerned with moving drugs across a 
border or seeking to overthrow a legitimate government. 
VEN behaviors are purpose driven to achieve the objectives 
of the network through influence on the population. VEN 
behaviors can be categorized by type as illustrated in the 
diagram below. 
 
Figure 2. Representation of VEN behaviors required for 
representation within social simulation. 
 
2.1.2. VEN Objectives 
 The objectives of VENs vary greatly. The diagram 
below serves to provide a frame of reference on the problem 
space, but is not intended to be all inclusive. 
 
 
Figure 3. Representation of VEN objectives required for 
representation within social simulation. 
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 2.1.3. VEN Organization 
 VENs vary greatly in their organizational structure, and 
an understanding of this structure is necessary for 
productive COA analysis [9-13]. Like all organizations, 
some VENs exhibit a more hierarchical structure, while 
others have operations that are planned and executed 
through a more decentralized cellular process. Moreover, 
VENs have organizational roles that will be filled by one or 
more individual members of the network, and these roles 
can be expressed through ontology.  
 
Figure 4. Representation of VEN organization required for 
representation within social simulation. 
2.2. Data Requirements 
 The data required to populate the representation of 
VENs within a social simulation mirrors the process of the 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield familiar to most 
members of the military intelligence community. All source 
information characterizing the composition of the threat 
including the personalities of individual actors within the 
network, and the networks organization and likely course of 
action are required to develop a realistic representation of 
the network and its likely actions. It is important to point out 
that the model serves as a framework for data management 
and fusion, common tasks for the intelligence community, 
and the exploration of future threat courses of action based 
on this knowledge. The development of these 
representations is an iterative process.  
 The population of the model also serves the important 
function of identifying gaps in knowledge about the network 
and their activities. As a starting point insight gained from 
the VEN's ideology and stated opinions is gathered. In some 
cases this information can be gathered from websites, in 
others from first person narratives from former members of 
the group or from individual's with first-hand knowledge of 
the group's activities. The identification of the group’s 
motivations and beliefs, values and interests is the goal of 
this stage of data development.  
 The organizational structure of the group must then be 
examined and fleshed out based on knowledge available 
concerning the functional roles that the group must have 
individual's serving in and the extent to which the identities 
of the individual's filling those roles is known. 
Organizational structure can be updated as new information 
about the VEN and its activity is gained.  
 Once personalities are identified within the VEN, 
narrative descriptions of these key individuals must be 
gathered, again from either existing accounts or from 
interviews with first person observers if possible. If 
available documents written by these individuals can 
provide great insight into the beliefs, values and interests of 
these key leaders. 
 
2.3. Potential Cognitive Modeling Approaches 
 Here we discuss the utility of potential agent patterns 
for the representation of the different roles within the VEN. 
Agents refer to anything that perceives its environment 
through sensors and acts on the environment through 
effectors [14]. Sensors provide the agent with percepts that 
inform them about the environment depending on the 
accessibility of the environment and the effectiveness of the 
sensor. The environment that entities interact with in social 
simulation typically consists of a social network. The 
approach required to represent these groups within models 
and simulations is chosen based on the use case and the data 
available. 
 Using the "Direct Action" role as an example, this 
section will illustrate the application of four agent templates 
to this domain: simple reflex, model-based reflex, goal-
based, and utility-based. In all cases the agent represents a 
member of a VEN assigned to a direct action role. The agent 
has access to his environment via messages from other 
members of the network and that update the percept average 
population support (APS).  APS is defined as the average 
population support for the host nation government and is 
expressed as a continuous value {0..1}. The direct action 
agent must choose from three action choices: 
randomViolence, intimidation, or declareVictory. 
 
2.3.1. Simple Reflex Agents 
 The simplest agent framework for consideration is a 
direct action agent is the reflex agent [14]. These agents use 
the current state of the world to select actions using simple 
logic statements. These entities have the benefit of simple 
implementations and typically require little computational 
Page 3
power.  Inaccessible environments can challenge reflex 
agents ability to achieve optimal performance. The 
importance of this limitation has not been fully explored in 
this domain. A reflex agent with a direct action role that 
takes action against a target based on a percept describing 
the civilian population's support of the government might 
follow the simple rule-set below. 
 
1. Update state. APSt: Average population support for the 
government from the portion of the population that the agent has 
access to at time t. 
2. Conditioned-based rule execution. 
if(APS>0.5){ 
 action = randomViolence; } 
3. Return action.   
 
 This agent pattern might be useful for some entities 
within the network, but is not likely sophisticated enough to 
be used throughout the threat network.  
 
2.3.2. Model-Based Reflex Agents 
 Model-based reflex agents differ from reflex agents in 
their ability to maintain an internal state based on a 
sequence of percepts [14]. Agents of this type require 
information about the state of the world and about how their 
own actions impact the world. The same direct action agent 
is described below as a simple model-based reflex agent, 
which considers information describing the outcome of its 
last attack and the current state of the population support for 
the government prior to making an action choice.  
 
1. Update state. APS: Average population support for the 
government from the portion of the population that the agent has 
access to at time t. 
2. Model-based rule execution. 
if(APS>0.5){ 
 if(lastAction=randomViolence){ 
  action = Intimidation; }} 
3. Return action.   
 
 This pattern provides additional flexibility and 
depending on the resolution of the model can likely 
accommodate the majority of the roles contained in the 
VEN in at least a rudimentary fashion. More sophisticated 
action choice models are possible using this pattern, 
including those allowing entities to select more actions 
based on previous success or failure. 
  
2.3.3. Goal-Based Agents 
 Goal-based agents explicitly represent goal states 
within the entity [14]. This allows entities to reason 
backwards from goals to determine actions required to meet 
achieve these goal states and allows greater flexibility for 
knowledge representation. This type of pattern might be 
appropriate for the leader or planner role of the insurgent 
network. Agents in these roles are planning actions with a 
goal state in mind in relation to the civilian population's 
support for the government.  
 
1. Update state. APS: Average population support for the 
government from the portion of the population that the agent has 
access to at time t. 
2. Goal check. Goal: Objective state of average population support 
for the government from the portion of the environment that the 
agent has access to at time t. 
if(APS<0.1){ 
 action = declareVictory;} 
3. Estimate distance of future states from Goal as a result of 
action selection. 
if(action = randomViolence){ 
 APS = APS - 0.2;} 
if(action = Intimidation){ 
 APS = APS - 0.1;} 
if(action = declareVictory){ 
 APS = APS - 0.05;} 
4. Return action that brings the agent closest to its goal state.   
    
 This framework can provide great flexibility and can be 
used in conjunction with a variety of search methods and 
heuristics to facilitate planning to achieve a goal state based 
on the level of accessibility of information in the 
environment. The resulting plan in this example is to 
conduct intimidation operations for two turns, resulting in 
an achievement of the goal state at the end of turn two. 
 
2.3.4. Utility-Based Agents 
 Utility based agent frameworks seek to choose 
behaviors to maximize or minimize the expected value of a 
utility function [14]. Backwards reasoning is not possible 
since the goal state is not clearly defined. The concept of 
utility allows the representation of any number resource 
constraints and the idea of value. The agents within this 
construct will choose the action or series of actions with the 
greatest value based on the defined utility function. In the 
example below each action has an associated cost along 
with an expected effect on the APS. 
 
1. Update state. APS: Average population support for the 
government from the portion of the population that the agent has 
access to at time t. 
2. Determine expected utility of next move.  
min C+APS {utility of selected  action for entity} 
ST: actioni*ci = C {cost function} 
     APS-actionEffecti=APS {change in APS caused by action i}    
3. Return action.   
   
 Decision networks and influence diagrams are useful in 
expressing the probabilistic nature of expected utility in 
graphical form for ease of understanding. 
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3. CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY MODEL FOR 
SOCIAL SIMULATION 
 The Cultural Geography (CG) model is a Java based, 
government owned, open source, agent based multi-agent 
system (MAS) model for representing social phenomena 
related to a population within a given geographical area 
during a specified period of time [15]. The reusable 
framework, composed of actors, objects and laws,  leverages 
“plug and play” java modules that implement theories from 
behavioral and social science, facilitating development and 
testing of theory-based simulations within a conflict 
ecosystem [16,17]. The data driven model is populated with 
methodology strongly tied to Mansoor's counter-insurgency 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield [6]. The 
framework can be generalized into a cognitive module and a 
social network structure module. 
 
3.1. Cognitive Module for Population Entities 
 The foundational social science concept for populating 
the cognitive identity of each population sub-type within the 
current CG model is the narrative paradigm. Based on the 
idea that each human possesses a unique narrative identity 
derived from their culture and life experiences, this identity 
encapsulated each entity's world view. The narrative identity 
is implemented as a Bayesian belief network (BBNs) for 
each entity in the simulation. Entities possess a unique BBN 
for each issue about which they hold an opinion that is 
represented within the model and these BBN constitute the 
internal state representation of each entity, managing the 
entity's strength of belief and interpretation of new events. 
Other models of entity cognition can be used within the 
framework dependent on the needs of the analysis and the 
availability of reasonable alternatives to the Bayesian 
approach. Bayesian networks provide a general approach to 
representing human cognition which philosophers have used 
for hundreds of years for this purpose. Note that current 
theoretical model implementations, such as the theory of 
planned behavior, within this social simulation also leverage 
BBN implementations.  
 The theory of planned behavior (TPB) controls the 
intention to take action within the simulation. It holds that 
individuals within a group form an intention execute a 
behavior based on: 1) their individual attitude toward the 
behavior, 2) their perception of group norms associated with 
that behavior, and 3) their perceived level of behavioral 
control in regard to that behavior. 
 
3.2. Social Network Module 
 Homophily, the theoretical underpinning for the social 
network representation of the population within the CG 
model, states that the likelihood of contact between 
individuals increases with their similarity among social 
factors.  Social factors include those human traits that affect 
social interaction, including socio-demographic, socio-
cultural, and socio-economic attributes. Homophily has a 
strong empirical history, and has been well-documented for 
a wide variety of social factors, including age, sex, birth 
region, education, religiosity, occupational prestige and 
socioeconomic status (SES) [18-20].  
 The current CG model uses a static social network 
based on ascribed attributes corresponding to the “baseline 
homophily” [18] or “induced homophily” [19]. The total 
distance between two entities as determined by their 
location in the social space defined by these factors is used 
to determine the strength of the tie connecting these two 
entities within the social, or homophily, network. This 
complete network describes the likelihood that any entity 
within the simulation will communicate with any other 
entity. The same structure can be informed by attained 
attributes that change dynamically during run time as actors 
interact and gain new information. Future implementations 
of the CG model will use issue stances derived from entity 
BBNs to inform this portion of the social network structure. 
 
3.3. Current VEN Representation 
 In the current implementation of the social simulation, 
the VEN agents do not contain a mechanism for managing 
beliefs, values and interests. Rather, their behavior is strictly 
guided by a Bayesian network implementation of TPB [21]. 
These VEN actions are interpreted by the civilian 
population as exogenous events. The following case study 
represents a proof of principle and examines the utility of 
using this simulation in VEN COA analysis.   
 
4. CASE STUDY: ATTACK THE NETWORK 
COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS WITHIN 
SOCIAL SIMULATION 
 Attack the network course of action analysis requires 
the use of designed experimentation in conjunction with an 
appropriate social simulation scenario. The scenario must 
represent the VEN in enough resolution to gain an 
understanding of how attack the network policies, both 
kinetic and non-kinetic, might impact the response of the 
civilian population within the area of the VEN. This is 
critical in these cases as the civilian population is typically 
the center of gravity in these types of operations. 
 
4.1. Case Study Description 
 The scenario for this case study is set in Iraq in 2008 
and uses data developed from open sources to describe the 
population in an urbanized area of approximately 400,000. 
The case study involves a stabilizing force operating in 
conjunction with host nation forces to improve the 
population’s perception of security in the area. Following 
Sageman and others [22][23], we portray the violent 
extremist network in the simulation as a scale-free social 
network of  15 agents (Figure 5) where the more central 
agents generally direct the violent activities of the group, 
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and the more peripheral agents  generally carry out the 
violent activities (e.g., suicide bombings). In addition, a 
more centrally located agent was responsible for strategic 
communications, attempting to influence the population’s 
perception of security through media campaigns (e.g., 
publicity, propaganda).  
 The base case actions for the friendly and opposing 
forces were developed through iterative war-gaming to 
simulate actions over the course of a six month time period. 
This analysis will seek to leverage this developed scenario 
to examine the impact of eight attack the network courses of 
actions (COAs) on the perceived security in the area.  
 
 
Figure 5. Network representation of VEN, nodes sized by degree. 
 The VEN was constructed using an algorithm that 
builds around the “first” person involved in the network, 
node 1, our nominal leader. Every node in the network will 
“recruit” new members, and new members are more likely 
to link to already well-connected members. Through social 
network analysis (SNA), we identified nodes that are 
“central” to the operations and information flow across the 
network. We used simple degree (number of links), 
betweenness (likeliness to be involved in the passing of 
information), and closeness (how long it takes their 
information to reach all other nodes) as our measures of 
centrality. We also calculated Borgatti’s “KeyPlayer” 
metrics to determine how the removal of one or more agents 
would fragment the VEN [24]. Agents at the periphery, 
identified by centrality measures, were linked to the 
population. Node 10, a somewhat central player, was 
identified as the “media” node, and also connected to the 
individuals in the populations, influencing strategic 
segments of the simulated society. 
 It’s not surprising that there is a high level of 
correlation between the centrality measures in a network 
this small, as there would be presumably in most real world 
VENs. Nodes 2 and 3, each have 10 links, making them the 
“hubs” of this small network in terms of absolute degree, 
where the VEN leader, node 1, and node 17 each have 9 
links. In terms of betweenness and closeness, node 3 scores 
the highest, followed by node 2, and then node 1. The 
removal of node 2 has the greatest impact on network 
fragmentation. 
 
4.2. Designed Experiment for COA Analysis 
 In order to leverage social simulations for attack the 
network course of action analysis, the use of exploratory 
designs of experiments is required [25,26]. In particular, the 
use of large exploratory designs of experiments are called 
for in order to explore the range of potential futures 
generated not only by potential courses of actions selected 
by decision makers, but by the noise created by the 
unpredictable nature of the VEN and its activity and the 
unknown variance within the human population being 
modeled. These models, under the best of circumstances, 
can produce insights into the problem domain and aid in the 
identification of potentially robust decisions and can aid in 
decision making under uncertainty. At a minimum they 
serve as a vehicle through which the decision maker and the 
analyst gain knowledge about the problem space, identify 
gaps in required data, and improve their intuition about the 
problem.  
 We designed a set of COAs given these statistics that 
included removing nodes 2, 3, and 10 (media). We removed 
these nodes individually and in each possible combination 
resulting in an 8-way design where the first COA was to 
take no action against the VEN (Figure 6). This base case 
allows us to develop a benchmark to compare with the 
subsequent COAs. Removing central nodes (such as 2 and 
3) from the VEN roughly equates to the arrest of those 
“key” individuals, whereas removing the media node from 
the network, given node 10’s relatively low centrality 
scores, more roughly equates to actions taken to limit the 
VEN’s media campaign.  
  
 Course of Action 
1 Take no intervention actions (Base case) 
2 Fragment network and interdict media campaign 
3 Remove the hub node 3 to disrupt communications 
4 Interdict VEN media campaign only 
5 Remove hub nodes 2 and 3 to fragment and disrupt 
6 Remove hub node 3 and interdict media campaign 
7 Fragment the network by removing node 2 
8 Remove nodes 2 and 3, and interdict media campaign 
Table 1. Eight design points and corresponding COAs. 
 The results of these design points are explored below, 
and it is important to note that the simulation does into take 
in to account the real world dynamics of shifting lines of 
communication. Networks change structure following the 
removal of key players, and some evidence points to the 
idea that central individuals are often quickly replaced. 
These dynamic features of all VENs are being implemented 
for the current version of the social simulation.  
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4.3. Results and COA Analysis 
 Initial analysis of the model output for the 8 design 
points (DP) explored for the aggregate population on the 
issue of security are shown in the figure below. Security is 
examined since it is the issue within the model most likely 
impacted by attack the network actions. The base case with 
no, interdiction of the network is shown by DP 1, in blue 
below. The subsequent analysis will examine DP 1, DP 3, 
and DP 8 in further detail.  
 
Figure 5. Visualization of potential futures based on COAs 1- 8. 
The figures below illustrate the communications network 
from 10-50 days and volume of communications regarding 
security over the course of the run for DP 1, the base case.  
 
 
Figure 6. Communication network structure (nodes sized by 
closeness, color indicates community grouping), t=10-50 & 
volume DP1. 
The same illustrations are shown in subsequent figures for 
DP 3 and DP 8 below. DP 3 resulted in the highest end of 
run issue stance while DP 8 resulted in one of the lowest 
end of run issue stances for security.  
 
 
Figure 7. Communication network structure (nodes sized by 




Figure 8. Communication network structure (nodes sized by 
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 In the networks above, the nodes are colored according 
to their community group via the Clauset-Newman-Moore 
algorithm [27]. Nodes in the same community are expected 
to interact frequently. As represented in the model, the COA 
of targeting only the key node in the VEN, DP 3, resulted in 
a higher level of satisfaction on the issue of security, while 
the COA targeting multiple nodes in conjunction with an 
active campaign to interdict the media, resulted in lower 
aggregate satisfaction and a greatly reduced volume of 
communications regarding the issue. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 The representation of violent extremist networks within 
social models and simulations can provide insight to 
decision makers in a wide variety of domains, add to the 
realism and robustness of counterinsurgency and stability 
operations training, and facilitate the analysis of future 
systems related to Irregular Warfare. Such representations 
can illuminate the second order and unintended 
consequences of attack the network courses of action. We 
addressed the requirements to represent these networks and 
the data required to develop unique representations of 
networks of interest. Potential agent frameworks for use in 
representing individual actors within the VEN were 
reviewed and a case study analysis was developed as an 
illustration of the concepts and utility of the approach. 
Future work is needed to explore the appropriateness of a 
variety of alternative agent frameworks within the social 
models and simulations through the use of larger space 
filling experimental designs in high performance computing 
environments, as well as continue the theory building 
process for the accurate and actionable M&S representation 
of violent extremist networks and civilian populations. 
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